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Environmental Effects of Trade in the Agricultural Sector:
A Case Study
I.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1. Agriculture has been at the center of conflicts over world trade from the beginning in
1986 of the eighth, Uruguay Round, of multilateral trade negotiations.  Yet it is only in the
final phases of the Round that linkages from trade to the environment have come to the
fore.  In this paper, the specific linkages from trade to the environment in the agricultural
sector are developed.  The impacts of trade flows and policies on environmental quality in
agriculture have features which make them unusually difficult to resolve.  In many respects,
the same domestic agricultural policies at the root of trade distortions also encourage
environmental damages.  Hence, reforming these domestic and trade policies would be a
partial, though not a complete, step in the direction of greater environmental benefits.  A
complete set of policies will require targeted environmental interventions as well.
2. Market failures in agricultural production and consumption have widespread effects
on soil, water, human health, and natural ecosystems which are difficult to monitor and
therefore to estimate.  These market failures are generally reinforced by government
policies which distort the prices of agricultural products and inputs (water, fertilizers,
pesticides).  These distortions occur in agriculture to a greater extent than in many sectors
of both developed and developing countries.  Trade flows and policies are a direct result of
these domestic distortions.
3. This case study will consider market failures with adverse environmental impacts in
agriculture and their interaction with failures in agricultural trade policy in developed and
developing countries.  Section II develops a theoretical perspective on market and
government failures in agriculture.  In it, a simple model is discussed which emphasizes the
distinction between the welfare effects of trade liberalization with and without appropriately
targeted environmental policies.  Section III provides some concrete examples of trade
flows in agriculture and their environmental impacts in developed and developing countries,
and analyzes the domestic policies at the root of distortions in agricultural trade.  Section
IV considers the likely impact of agricultural trade liberalization on market failures with
adverse environmental effects, and the need to integrate environmental and trade policy
reforms.  Section V discusses the relationship between trade and environmental policy
instruments in this context, and proposes some principles to guide trade and environmental
policy in the agricultural sector.  Section VI offers a summary and some proposed
guidelines for the agricultural sector.2
II.  A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
A.  MARKET FAILURE AND GOVERNMENT FAILURE IN AGRICULTURE
4. In comparison with other sectors, the impacts of agricultural trade on environmental
quality reflect a double dilemma.  First, agricultural production is replete with examples of
market failure;
1 that is, the prices of inputs and outputs in agricultural markets do not fully
reflect the social costs of soil and water depletion, nonpoint source pollution, deforestation,
and other adverse impacts of agricultural production.  These externalities and "public bads"
are not restricted to agriculture, and characterize many other sectors as well, leading to
recent calls to bring such "external" factors into the accounting framework of private and
public decision makers.
2
5. Yet market failures in agriculture are especially difficult to monitor and to estimate. 
Soil losses due to erosion, for example, occur over large areas and are borne by both wind
and water, leading to many costs that occur far from the site of the damage.  Similarly,
contamination of underground aquifers with farm chemicals occurs in underground
hydrological systems and over many years.  Until quite recently, these nonpoint pollution
problems confounded the ability to identify "the polluter" and thus to allocate the costs of
this pollution to individuals and firms in ways which efficiently and fairly "internalized" the
externality.
3  This is one reason agricultural conservation policy has tended toward
subsidies (bribes) to induce more environmentally responsible behavior.  There are also
political explanations for this tendency, which are related to a second dilemma in resolving
problems of adverse environmental impacts from agriculture.
6. The second dilemma is that agriculture faces a problem of government or
"nonmarket" failure.
4  This failure is the subject of a large literature, because dysfunctional
agricultural policies are endemic to both developed and developing countries.
5  These
failures appear worse in agriculture than in many other sectors.  In developed countries,
agricultural interest groups have spawned policies which support output prices well above
market-clearing levels, and in some cases input prices (e.g., water) well below these levels. 
In developing countries, output prices are generally held below world market levels as a
subsidy to urban consumers, while input prices (credit, fertilizer, water) are manipulated by
government agencies either to tax or subsidize farmers.
7. The double dilemma faced by the agricultural sector is that these government failures
tend to reinforce rather than mitigate market failures, compounding the adverse impacts of
agriculture on the environment.
6  When output prices are held artificially high and input
prices held low, the effect is to encourage excessive soil and water degradation as farmers
intensify production and expand to more vulnerable soils and streambeds.
7  Conversely,
when farm incomes are taxed by artificially lowering food prices to subsidize consumers,
and input markets are distorted, as in many developing countries, deforestation and other
land misuses are encouraged.
8  Many advocates of correcting market failures in agriculture3
presume that governments are able and willing to develop accounting frameworks and
regulations to internalize external costs.  But given the record of government
mismanagement in agriculture, it would be more accurate to say that the accounting
framework and regulatory environment have been manipulated in a way that encourages
negative externalities.  It follows that if these market failures are to be mitigated,
government policies which distort agricultural markets must also be squarely addressed.
8. Almost all agricultural trade policies emanate from domestic price manipulation.  As
D. Gale Johnson has noted,
"The trade measures that each country adopts are an adjunct of its
domestic farm policies.  In most cases, a specific trade restrictive or
interfering device has been adopted, not for its particular direct benefits,
but because it is a device that will make it possible for a domestic
measure to function."
9
There is thus a close linkage from agricultural trade reform, based on revisions in domestic
policies in both developed and developing countries, and environmental policy reform to
correct market failures in agriculture.  The same domestic policies in the name of which
trade is distorted are also responsible for a large share of the environmental damages in
agriculture.  Of course, even if such reforms were undertaken, high commodities prices
arising from market forces could also lead to environmental stress on land and water
resources.  While domestic policy reforms are not likely to be sufficient to address a variety
of environmental problems in agriculture, they are nonetheless necessary if these market
failures are to be confronted.  Such measures would generally work in the same direction as
more targeted environmental interventions.
B.  TARGETS, INSTRUMENTS, AND THE EFFICACY OF INTERVENTION
9. In his classic analysis of government policy, Tinbergen argued that in general, each
target of policy merits a separate instrument aimed at this target.
10  Environmental targets,
in other words, are generally best met by environmental policies; and domestic agricultural
and trade targets by domestic agricultural and trade policies.  The distinction between
market and government failure should not be confused with this targets and instruments
distinction.  Whereas environmental problems may be reinforced by domestic agricultural
and trade policies, they are unlikely to be best resolved through such measures alone. 
Instead there will be some combination of domestic agricultural and trade policies, and
environmental policies, which is most efficient.
11  In fact, it can be shown that the
advantages of agricultural policy reform can be lost if appropriate environmental actions are
not undertaken jointly.  Put the other way round, environmental and domestic agricultural
and trade policy reforms can be shown to be mutually consistent in welfare terms, as well as
in political and budgetary terms.4
10. The interdependence of trade and environment has gained the attention of both the
environmental and trade communities in large measure because critics contend that trade
liberalization is likely to exacerbate environmental problems.  It will be argued here that if
this interdependence is acknowledged, and appropriately targeted environmental
interventions accompany domestic agricultural and trade policy reform, such fears are less
warranted.  Indeed, if an appropriate combination of environmental and agricultural policy
measures is found, addressed to market and government failure in agriculture, the result can
be both welfare gains from domestic agricultural and trade reforms and from improvements
in the level of environmental quality.
C.  THE WELFARE ANALYTICS OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
12
11. Anderson presents a simple analytical description of trade and environmental policy
interaction which clarifies many of these issues, as well as underscoring how difficult they
are to resolve.  Using partial equilibrium, comparative static analysis, he first describes a
small country facing both market failures and the prospect of trade liberalization, in which
its own actions do not affect the rest of the world.  He then considers the large country
case, in which they do have global effects.
13
12. Suppose a small country produces or consumes an agricultural commodity, such as
maize, in which an externality results from the market's failure to reflect the impact of its
(and only its) production or consumption on the natural environment.  An example of a
production externality might be soil erosion which reduces the productivity of agricultural
lands and lowers water quality.  An example of a consumption externality might be water
pollution from farm chemicals which raises the risk of water-borne disease.
14
13. The result of the externality is to drive a "wedge" between private and social costs of
production, reflected in the divergence of S and SN in Figure 1.  These alternative supply
curves measure marginal private and social costs, respectively.  The demand curve, D,
measures marginal private benefits.  The price axis refers to the price of maize relative to all
other prices in the economy, which remain constant throughout.
14. In this case, OQ is the level of maize production without either (a) international trade
or (b) measures to "internalize" environmental impacts such as erosion.  Production occurs
at point e, the intersection of private marginal benefits and costs.  Net social welfare is
given as the sum of producer and consumer surplus,
15 minus the social costs of the external
effect, or abe ! ade.  Now assume that the country shifts from autarchy (no trade), to open
trade.  If OP0 is the prevailing international (border) price, as in Figure 1(a), production
would fall to OQm, consumption would rise to OCm and QmCm units of maize would be
imported.  Net social welfare is now abfg ! ahg, and the welfare gain is defgh.  This gain
from trade is both positive and greater than it would have been if no externality had existed
in the form of erosion, by the shaded area degh.  In effect, the5
country benefits because it imports maize more cheaply than it can producer it, and benefits
by reducing soil erosion as well.  Imports are "substitutes" for erosion.
15. On the other hand, suppose OP1 is the prevailing international (border) price, as in
Figure 1(b).  The country would thus become a net exporter of CxQx units of maize if it
moved to open trade.  Net social welfare would be abik ! amk, so the welfare effect of
trade liberalization without any action to internalize the effects of erosion would be eik !
edmk, which could be a net gain or net loss, depending on the relative magnitude of the
gain from trade versus the loss from increased erosion as production expanded from Q to6
Qx.
16. From Anderson's analysis, several propositions follow.  The first is that liberalizing
trade in a good with adverse environmental impacts which are left uncontrolled improves a
small country's welfare if following liberalization it imports the good; but if it exports it, the
negative environmental effects are subtracted from the gains from trade, and the welfare
effect is ambiguous.  By importing the polluting good, a country lets some other country
worry about its polluting properties.  By exporting it, it continues to face the social cost of
these externalities in the home market.
17. Now suppose that instead of leaving erosion uncontrolled, the small country
combined trade reform with an environmental policy intervention sufficient to internalize
the externality.  Such an intervention could take the form of a tax, charge, or equivalent
regulation or change in property rights.
16  Given such an environmental policy intervention,
the gain from trade liberalization is qcf in Figure 1(a) and cij in Figure 1(b), depending on
whether maize is imported or exported.  In contrast to the situation in which no
environmental intervention occurs, this is a net gain in either the importing or exporting
case.
18. It is important to note, however, that without environmental intervention, the benefits
of liberalization for the exporter would be even greater, by cde.  Hence, an incentive exists
for net exporters to forego environmental interventions because the benefits from trade are
reduced somewhat by the production declines resulting from such environmental policy
interventions.  In this restricted sense, it is accurate to say that environmental interventions
reduce an exporting nation's "competitiveness."  But the larger loss is in net welfare, in that
without such interventions, it is not clear that expanded exports will improve net welfare at
all.
19. However, whether a small country is an importer or an exporter, there is a welfare
gain from trade for a small country provided that a targeted (nearly optimal) environmental
policy is introduced.
20. A third proposition of direct relevance to agricultural trade concerns the relative
efficacy of trade and environmental policy instruments.  Suppose that instead of targeted
environmental policy interventions aimed at erosion control, it was proposed to use a trade
instrument such as an export tax aimed at the same target.  This is shown in Figure 1(b). 
An export tax could be used equal to js to lower the price producers receive from P1 to PN 1,
reducing production and lowering exports form CxQx to CN xQN x.  This would lower the
marginal cost of production to a level equivalent to an environmental intervention,
producing a welfare gain of shaded area jmk.  But the export tax causes consumers to pay
PN 1P1 below the opportunity cost of OP1, leading to a deadweight welfare loss due to excess
domestic consumption CxCN x, equal to the shaded area iuv.  Hence, using a trade policy
instrument reduces environmental degradation as much as an environmental production tax
policy set at the same rate, but at higher cost.
17  7
Trade instruments can be used to reduce environmental degradation by a given amount, but
they generally will improve welfare less than a more direct intervention at the source of the
environmental pollution, and may even worsen welfare.
18
21. Moving from the small to the large country case, it is possible that the liberalization
and/or environmental policies undertaken will affect world prices, so that the price lines in
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) are no longer horizontal.  Moreover, the environmental policies and
polluting activities of large countries such as the United States or European Community
will have global impacts, spilling over and ultimately back into home markets and welfare. 
Finally, policy changes in large countries may have demonstration or leadership effects on
other countries.
19
22. In summary, the welfare effects of liberalizing trade are ambiguous if environmental
externalities are left uncontrolled;  but if they are largely internalized by an appropriately
targeted environmental policy, the joint "liberalization effect" and "environmental effect" on
welfare is positive.
20
23. Simple welfare analysis thus offers an analytical foundation for issues in agricultural
trade and the environment.  At an empirical level, however, there is still very little
understanding of the effects of trade liberalization on the environment, and how different
commodities and countries will be affected.  Trade liberalization is also unlikely to be total
or all inclusive, so that distortions and adverse environmental impacts will remain.  And
higher prices and levels of economic activity following liberalization can have the same
effects as artificial price supports, encouraging resource degradation, unless targeted
environmental policies accompany them.  
24. Such analysis also has limits imposed by technical measurement problems and the
political realities of policy formulation.  First, it has been difficult to measure the divergence
between marginal private and social cost for an externality such as erosion or water
pollution for the reasons mentioned above.  Without an estimate of this divergence,
designing appropriate taxes or regulations to internalize the externality has been
problematic.  Second, even if governments had reliable estimates of these damages (which
are now increasingly available), successful intervention faces several forms of nonmarket or
government failure.  The political influence of agricultural interests has allowed them to
remain largely removed from most environmental regulations until quite recently.  In the
United States, for example, agriculture has been largely exempted from the Clean Water
Act, as amended.  Third, agricultural policies themselves have actually contributed to and
reinforced the environmental externalities above.  In the face of such distortions, more than
optimal environmental policies are necessary:  substantial reforms in agricultural price and
trade policies are required as well.8
III. TRADE FLOWS IN AGRICULTURE:  POLICY DISTORTIONS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
25. In this section, some concrete examples of trade flows in agriculture and their
environmental impacts are discussed, focusing first on developed and then on developing
countries' policies.  In both cases, the relationship between domestic agricultural and trade
policies, and environmental damages, is complex.  While growing agricultural trade in the
post-war period has added to general pressure on land, water and forest resources, this
volume of trade has also responded to important demands.  On the one hand, it has
occurred in response to domestic and foreign population and income growth.  On the other,
it has resulted from agricultural and related trade policies which have artificially supported
the prices of some crops relative to others, and subsidized the prices of many inputs, such
as water, fertilizers and pesticides.
21
26. Broadly speaking, it is the commodity composition of agricultural trade, together
with the increasing use of water, fertilizer and chemical inputs, in food production, which
account for the majority of environmental concerns in agriculture.
22  Commodity
composition refers simply to the mix of farm products produced.  Agricultural production
has become increasingly specialized at the farm level since the 1950s, especially in the
OECD countries.  Specialization occurs naturally in the course of trade, but the degree of
specialization at the farm level in such crops as maize or cotton, as well as the
concentration of livestock production in limited geographic areas, has been driven in many
developed countries less by market demand than by domestic and related trade policies that
subsidize this narrow production focus directly and indirectly.  The increasing use of
chemical inputs has occurred in large part because the demand for them is derived from the
demand for farm output, whether the demand arises in the market or from government
subsidies and purchases.  As it happens, the same crops which governments have subsidized
have accounted for the bulk of irrigation, fertilizer and pesticide applications.
23  In addition
to the derived demand for water, fertilizer and chemicals, many governments have further
subsidized the use of these inputs by tax allowances or price markdowns that make them
less expensive to use.
27. Many of these changes in production, especially in developing countries, have been
justified as necessary to feed growing populations or to increase food self-sufficiency as a
matter of trade policy and national security.  The result has been that adverse environmental
consequences have been treated as unfortunate but probably justifiable by-products
(externalities) in meeting these challenges.  As this perspective changes, especially in the
OECD countries, the demand for new environmental regulations will effectively raise the
cost of environmentally irresponsible farm production methods, inducing new, more
environmentally benign technologies.
24  However, this process is just beginning, and the
market and government failures of the post-war period have clearly generated substantial
environmental damages.  And as long term population growth continues to require
increases to food production, environmental issues in agriculture are likely to remain
important.9
28. Throughout this section, the same points noted above recur:  policies that distort
trade in agriculture can also have adverse environmental impacts, so that reducing these
distortions will be likely to move in a positive environmental direction.  However, more
carefully targeted environmental interventions must also be undertaken to enhance
landscape, water and soil quality.  This section thus provides descriptive evidence for the
points outlined in Section II, in which welfare gains were shown to depend on a joint
undertaking of domestic agricultural and trade policy, and environmental policy, reform,
with appropriately targeted interventions in each area.
A.  EXAMPLES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1.  The United States
(a) Federal Agricultural Policies
29. Both the commodity composition and levels of input use in U.S. agriculture are a
direct function of the complex schemes used to support domestic agricultural prices at
levels higher than generally prevail in world markets.  These subsidies take various forms
but their overall effect is artificially to support the prices of a selected set of "program
commodities," notably maize and wheat (which accounted for half of total budgetary
outlays for the commodity programs in 1990), barley, oats, cane and beet sugar, rice,
cotton, tobacco, peanuts, honey, dairy, wool and mohair.  Farmers, when faced with a
choice of growing a highly subsidized crop such as maize or cotton with minimal rotations,
as opposed to a greater annual rotation with less subsidy, do what is "boundedly rational." 
They tend to grow the subsidized crops year after year.
30. Given that domestic price levels for these crops are set higher than global prices,
import duties or quotas must also be established so that the schemes are not undermined by
cheaper imports.  And because these schemes generate chronic surpluses, mechanisms of
surplus disposal, including export subsidies, are used to remove them and their price
depressing effects from the domestic market.  Hence both import barriers and export
subsidies derive in the first instance from decisions to pay more than market prices through
commodity-by-commodity subsidies for a specific subset of crops farmers can potentially
grow.  This is the origin of the "Section 22" exclusion sought by the U.S. and granted in
GATT, which allows import protection for a variety of program commodities such as milk
and sugar.  It is also the main origin of the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) initiated in
the 1985 Farm Bill to subsidize exports of surplus stocks.
25
31. While the trade impacts of these policies show up in confrontations over tariff and
nontariff barriers in GATT, the specific impacts of these distortions on the environment are
less apparent at the level of international trade.  It is at the farm level that the distortions do
their environmental damage, by sending signals to farmers about what crops to plant, how10
often to plant them in relation with other crops or fallow, and how much water, fertilizer
and chemical pesticides to apply to them.  Farmers are not unaware of these signals but
have little incentive to change decisions which are rewarded by government policies.  All of
these decisions in turn affect levels of soil erosion, water pollution in streams due to soil
and fertilizer runoff, as well as leaching of pesticides and nitrogen from fertilizers and
manure into underground water supplies.  In addition to these effects on soil and water,
reduced crop diversity and chemical pollution threaten wildlife habitat and recreation
opportunities for fishing, hunting, boating and the appreciation of natural plant and animal
populations.
26  Excessive levels of pesticide, herbicide and pesticide applications near
human settlements have caused poisonings, and their long term health effects are under
investigation by epidemiologists and toxicologists.
27
32. The essential explanation for these environmental impacts is that markets neither
penalize farmers for them, nor offer rewards for avoiding or reducing them.  Government
attempts to do so, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and "sodbuster and
swampbuster" legislation have been only marginally effective.  Overriding these efforts are
government price support payments which have encouraged a commodity mix narrower
than would be the case if payments were not restricted to certain crops, and have promoted
high levels of water, fertilizer and chemical use.
33. Consider two examples:  one on the output side and the other on the input side.  The
output is cotton.  The input is water.  Cotton is erosive, highly irrigated and treated with a
variety of chemicals to prevent insect infestations and plant diseases.  It is grown intensively
in California's Central Valley and in other regions where it consumes large quantities of
water, which leads in turn to leaching of chemicals into surface and groundwater.  Without
substantial subsidies paid in the form of marketing loans and deficiency payments as well as
input subsidies that provide irrigation water virtually free to many cotton producers, it is
doubtful that U.S. production would be as intensive, creating opportunities for lower-cost
imports from developing countries.  The environmental consequences in the form of
chemical contamination of soils are sufficient, in the words of one environmental
toxicologist and public health specialist, to make some areas of the Central Valley "unfit for
human habitation."
28
34. In the South Central U.S., water for irrigation is pumped from a huge aquifer, the
Ogallala, at rates demonstrably above recharge capacity.  Extraction has been encouraged
by tax laws that allow a "water depletion allowance."  Rather than "internalizing" the
negative external effects of irrigation, they have actually been encouraged.  In 17 Western
states of the U.S., 40-50 million acres are under irrigation, which accounts for 90 percent of
the consumptive use of water.  It is estimated that 90 percent of the capital costs of
irrigation conducted under the federal Bureau of Reclamation are subsidized for irrigating
farmers.  Farmers in the West San Joaquin Valley of California, for example, pay less than
10 percent of the delivery cost of water.
2911
35. The effect of agricultural price manipulation on production decisions and commodity
composition has thus been large.  Over the 1980s, government payments were a growing
fraction of net farm income, especially in regions where program crop production
predominated.  Commodity composition responded directly and significantly to these
payments.
30  In recent years, between 80 and 95 percent of program crop acreage has been
enrolled in the federal commodity programs.
31  Because acreage reduction programs are
also necessary in order to damp down surpluses resulting from price supports, it is difficult
for the government to guess how much the supply control "brake" should be applied in the
face of the "accelerator" of both market and government price signals.  Moreover, farmers
regularly retire acres of lowest productivity, leading to substantial "slippage" in the amount
of production actually reduced through mandated acreage reductions.  Over time, growing
surpluses have generated pressure in turn for export subsidies to clear domestic markets.
36. Despite their failings, domestic agricultural and trade policies in the U.S. simplify a
key issue at the farm level:  what to plant?  If government provides deficiency payments
well above the market price for maize, compared with soybeans, farmers will be inclined to
plant maize.  If retaining eligibility for government price support payments for maize
requires continuous cropping, then farmers will be inclined to forego rotations with other
crops.  Finally, since government deficiency payments have been based on a farm's or a
county's average yields, farmers will be inclined to raise yields, beyond the point that market
forces might dictate.  All three of these judgments:  what to plant, how often to plant in
rotation with other crops, and how far to push yields, have direct implications both for
commodity composition and water, fertilizer and chemical use.  Planting decisions on the
farm are increasingly tied to deficiency payment announcements rather than market
conditions (farmers refer to this as "farming the government").  The result is to reduce the
diversity of cropping and to encourage crops that depend heavily on chemical inputs.  Corn
and wheat now account for over 50 percent of all nitrogen fertilizer applications in the
U.S.
32
37. A related issue concerns the mix of crop and livestock production.  Livestock
production (except dairy and wool) receives no direct government price supports. 
Traditionally, in addition to off-farm income augmentation farmers kept livestock (poultry,
hogs, cattle) as one form of insurance against price fluctuations in grain crops.  Livestock
also utilized available labor more effectively and were an on-farm source of manure.  Over
the 1970s and 1980s, increasing government subsidization of grains and oilseeds made this
crop/livestock insurance less necessary.  In addition, legislation restricting practices on
feedlots encouraged many farmers to reduce livestock and to specialize in "cash grains,"
thus increasing their reliance on purchased fertilizer nutrients instead of manure nutrients
from livestock or legume nitrogen from crop rotations.  (Manure itself may have adverse
environmental impacts, and usually can supply only a fraction of total fertilizer demands.) 
Poultry and other livestock production have increasingly become separate specialties,
leading to large feeding operations which pose major problems of waste disposal.12
38. A second major effect of government programs concerns how often a certain crop is
planted in rotation with others.  U.S. commodity programs have included acreage "bases"
for each of several crops.  This "base acreage" entitles the farmer to crop price support
payments in relation to its size.  But retaining the base has also required that the specific
crop continue to be grown on the farm year after year:  program "base" has generally been
decreased if the acreage planted declines.  This is a disincentive to rotate program crops,
such as maize, wheat and barley, with non-program crops, such as grasses, alfalfa, or other
specialty crops that are less prone to soil erosion, and might decrease the need for some
fertilizer nutrients and chemical inputs.
39. Third, government program benefits have also been calculated according to average
yields, sometimes referred to as "yield base".  Prior to the current farm bill, farmers have
had an economic incentive to increase yield if the higher yield in one or more years would
increase the yield base and thus returns from the government program over a number of
years in the future.  In a recent study in Minnesota, Lyman, et. al., found that farmers
choosing green manure rotations (e.g., alfalfa) were seriously penalized by loss of wheat
and barley base, creating a dilemma -- between choosing more agronomically sound
rotation practices and foregoing future program benefits -- or protecting base acres at the
expense of environmental considerations.  This is what Lyman, et. al., called a "vise grip." 
The specific consequences of this "vise grip" for environmental quality were explored more
recently by a research team from the World Resources Institute, which examined two case
study farms in Pennsylvania and Nebraska.
33  The study compared the effects of these
policies on the two farms with a 1985 baseline, using a resource accounting framework
consistent with internalizing the external costs of soil erosion.  In both case studies
(discussed in greater detail in Section IV), they found that domestic agricultural and trade
policy reforms based on "decoupling" payments from specific crops produced the greatest
net economic values, inclusive of the cost of resource depletion due to soil erosion.  The
benefits varied greatly depending on tillage methods, but reforms based on "decoupled"
payments resulted in higher net economic values for all rotations and treatments with the
best results if environmental policies were closely targeted.  The study also concluded that
the "polluter pays" principle should be applied more widely to agriculture.
40. In summary, because of U.S. commodity and acreage reduction programs, risks have
been reduced if farmers grow a relatively restricted group of crops.  The effect has been to
encourage the intensive cultivation of these crops, to the exclusion of rotation and
diversification.  The overriding importance of agricultural price and income support policy
at the federal level creates major opportunities to improve the agronomic and environmental
impacts of farming practices through changes in those policies over time.  However, even if
such changes were undertaken, and farmers were allowed to plant more freely in response
to markets, there would still be conflicts between some of these signals and reduction in
environmental concerns.  High commodity prices raise the opportunity costs of rotations,
whether these prices originate from government subsidies or the market alone.  For this13
reason, targeted environmental policies will continue to be important in promoting
improved impacts of agricultural practices.  The question is:  are current U.S.
environmental policies doing this?  The evidence suggests that the sort of targeted, "nearly
optimal" environmental interventions discussed in theory above are a long distance from
current realities.
(b)  Environmental Regulations
41. Three main issues dominate the U.S. environmental policies as they affect
agriculture.
34  The first is water pollution.  The EPA has identified agriculture as the largest
nonpoint source of surface water pollution.
35  As Clark, et al. (1985) note:
In addition to biological damages, the off-farm cost of agricultural runoff
from increased flood damages, impaired recreational opportunities, and
interference with water conveyance facilities, industrial and municipal
uses has been estimated at $2.2 billion per year.
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The second and related issue is the safety of groundwater supplies.  Approximately 50
million people in 1,437 counties rely on potentially contaminated groundwater for drinking. 
These problems tend to be localized in areas of concentrated agriculture and/or specific
geologic formations that are conducive to rapid transport of contaminants to the water
table.  The third area of concern is fragile land areas such as wetlands and native prairie. 
Approximately one million acres of wetlands are drained each year, the vast majority for
agriculture, threatening the breeding ground and habitat for approximately two thirds of the
major commercial fish species and many types of waterfowl.
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42. The primary mechanisms to deal with these issues are the "conservation compliance,"
"sodbuster" and "swampbuster" provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill, together with the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  Conservation compliance requires farmers to
develop conservation plans for their farms, and after 1990 penalizes farmers who fail to do
so or cultivate highly erosive land by loss of all farm program payments for all crops grown
on the entire farm.  While a seemingly draconian measure, conservation compliance has
several essential design flaws that make it difficult to implement.  First, in times of high
reliance on government deficiency payments (and other government payments) for net farm
income, it has come to be viewed by farmers and their elected representatives in Congress
as an excessively punitive measure, out of proportion to the environmental damages likely
to occur. Thus, when farm income payments are high due to low prices, enforcement is
problematic, and a variety of loopholes have been created through legislative and
administrative means.  Noting weakened standards in the key farm states of Iowa and
Nebraska in April, 1990, the Center for Rural Affairs (1990) raised the concern that "The
Soil Conservation Service [of USDA] is sending a signal to other regions and states that
weaker erosion standards are acceptable."
38  But even when market prices rise (reducing
deficiency payments), the incentive to undercut conservation compliance remains, because14
when prices are high, conservation is most threatened by the incentive to farm every
available acre.  And when prices are high, the penalty for noncompliance -- the deficiency
payment -- is low.
43. The "sodbuster" and "swampbuster" provisions suffer from related problems.  The
first is designed to limit the plowing of cropland designated as highly erosive; the second to
limit the conversion of designated wetlands to croplands.  To do either leads, in principle,
to the future loss of eligibility for all farm programs.  Again, these laws are likely to be
undercut precisely when they are most needed by administrators and legislators who view
the penalties involved as excessive.  The National Wildlife Federation, after seeking access
to USDA records under the Freedom of Information Act, found that as of April, 1989,
"there are only 26 producers in the entire United States who have actually lost benefits as a
result of swampbuster violations which occurred between December 23, 1985 and April 15,
1989."
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44. One obvious amendment to the provisions would be to impose mandatory financial
penalties (fees) for lack of conservation compliance as well as sodbusting and
swampbusting on a graduated basis, depending on the number of acres affected and the
degree of damage.  These fees can be allocated based on estimates of damages from
hydrological and land use data increasingly available to government agencies.  They could
either be subtracted from deficiency payments or (since many farmers receive few if any
such payments) simply assessed through the EPA or Department of the Treasury, entirely
outside the USDA enforcement apparatus.  By graduating penalties to fit the magnitude of
the damage, and divorcing them from commodity programs, environmental goals consistent
with the polluter pays principle and the targets and instruments distinction noted in Section
II would be achieved.
45. The other major program designed to promote environmental conservation is the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  Unlike the above programs, its primary objective is
temporary acreage retirements through voluntary ten year bid contracts, in which
landowners with eligible acres (previously cropped land designated as highly erosive) are
paid rent by USDA to convert it to conservation uses, such as grass and forest cover, for
which USDA may share the costs.  At the end of the ten year contract, some of this land is
likely to be subject to conservation compliance, swampbuster and sodbuster provisions,
although the enforcement problems cited above will remain.
46. The CRP currently has enrolled about 34 million acres, and has a goal of 45 million. 
The program has been afflicted with problems in targeting lands most subject to
environmental damage.  Departing from the "polluter pays principle," the federal
government instead opted to "pay the polluter," leading to anything but optimal
environmental interventions.  While modest land improvements are required under the
program, in essence it pays polluters not to pollute, rather than rewarding farmers for15
environmental "affirmative actions."  And in emphasizing ten-year contracts, it has not
allowed sufficiently for permanent retirement of vulnerable lands through easements. 
Indeed, farmers whose land has been carefully protected from erosion find themselves
ineligible.  Instead, farmers are asked to "bid" how much they need to be paid in per-acre
rent to remove land already eroding at high levels from production.  Even in the low
commodity and land price environment of the mid-1980s, these bids were pushed up by the
high levels of acreage retirement then already in force, together with the fact that the CRP
reduced farm base, and thus eligibility for future deficiency payments.  Combined with an
administrative imperative to get as many acres into the CRP as possible, accepted bids have
substantially exceeded market rental values in many areas, predictably adding hundreds of
millions of dollars a year to the cost of the program.
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47. In addition to its excessive costs, the design of the CRP has failed to make use of
information available to USDA to target lands most in need of retirement, some of the same
information available to allocate fees and penalties.  Despite massive computerized
information gathering exercises (Natural Resource Inventories) conducted by the federal
government in recent years to determine the vulnerability of various land categories to
environmental damages, this information has not been applied systematically to distinguish
the vulnerable lands that are low in productivity (and thus relatively inexpensive to retire
from production) from those that are highly productive and/or not vulnerable at all.
48. A third main area of environmental regulation impinging on agriculture is the Clean
Water Act, as amended.  Until recently, agriculture has received a blanket exemption from
the Act.  However, under 1987 amendments to the Act, EPA is given authority to require
states to submit groundwater protection plans, which may include agricultural leaching of
fertilizers and chemicals including pesticides.  These state plans, if enforced, may lead to
increasingly stringent restrictions on farm input use, although such restrictions have yet to
be widely felt.  EPA has adopted a state-by-state approach to such regulation, which leads
to the devolution of responsibility from federal to state agencies.
49. While arguably more efficiently targeted, in the sense that each state's problems
differ, this approach relegates difficult decisions to state agencies with comparatively
limited resources, and raises the distinct and important problem of a patchwork of different
standards and regulations to which input suppliers will be forced to respond.  In particular,
a lack of state resources may contribute to a growing movement to tax fertilizer and
chemical inputs, such as Iowa's recent tax on nitrogen fertilizers.  These taxes will raise
revenues, but also farm costs, and do not really target polluters, since all users of nitrogen
pay the tax regardless of their management practices.  The available evidence suggests that
they would need to nearly double the price of fertilizer to have any major impact on use. 
For example, Hrubovcak, LeBlanc and Miranowski (1990) concluded that a 10 percent tax
on agricultural chemicals would only decrease use by 6 percent, and a 100 percent tax
(doubling the price) would decrease chemical use by 34 percent.  And reducing commercial
fertilizer use would not necessarily reduce total applications of nitrogen fertilizers, since
some manure might be substituted.
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50. Even more significant are recent developments in U.S. liability laws involving holding
farmers financially responsible for nonpoint source pollution (such as contaminated wells). 
Here the polluter pays principle has been enforced by the courts.  Farm lenders have also
been found potentially liable, extending the polluter pays principle to include what in U.S.
legal circles is known as the "deep pockets" principle.  It is possible that farmers and their
lenders may be found financially liable for damages resulting from non-point source
pollution which was previously untraceable and is increasingly defined as a contestable
damage under law.  The U.S. Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, for example, recently
convened a panel of water experts who saw such legal developments leading to the possible
"end of the Agricultural Exemption from the provisions of the Clean Water Act."
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51. In summary, environmental policies both within the ambit of the Farm Bill, and
outside it, such as the Clean Water Act, as amended, each impose both direct and indirect
requirements on farmers to comply with a variety of new and changing regulations.  These
regulations are not likely to ease in the future, and instead will become more binding. 
However, they can all be substantially improved on both environmental and domestic
agricultural and trade policy grounds by (a) better targeting of land use policies and (b)
more refined applications and extensions of the polluter pays principle to agriculture.
2.  The European Community.
(a) The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
52. While different in character, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European
Community (EC) functions in much the same way as price supports in the U.S., insofar as it
encourages excess production in the subset of commodities receiving this support; this
excess production reduces the diversity of cropping practices on-farm, and encourages
continued planting of crops with reduced rotations.  Export subsidies and import levies are
necessary to insulate the EC from foreign competition.  In order to maximize yields per
hectare (since payments are made on units of production) extremely high levels of fertilizer
and chemical inputs are applied, the demand for which is derived in part from the levels of
subsidy paid to output.  The consequence is to increase soil losses due to erosion, but in
Europe the primary impact is on water quality.  In the livestock sector, concentrated
production units also create major waste disposal problems.
54. The history and functioning of the Common Agricultural Policy are beyond the scope
of this paper, but it is important to emphasize that its original objectives revolved around
trade policy and food security, and that environmental considerations were clearly
secondary.  Over time, however, the intensification and specialization of European
agriculture has begun to arouse alarm in environmental circles.
43  The Food and Agriculture17
Organization (FAO) in their 16th Regional Conference for Europe, identified four major
environmental problems resulting directly from European agricultural production,
summarized in Box 1.
44  These are:
 -- Pollution and contamination of soil, water, air and food resulting from
increased agrichemical use and livestock effluents;
 -- Degradation of natural resources, and particularly, deterioration in the quality
of soil, water, forests and traditional rural landscapes;
 -- Disturbance and reduction of biotopes and wildlife habitats;
 -- Reduction in wildlife species and loss of biological and genetic diversity.
55. Specific examples of these problems cited by FAO (1990) include soil contamination
and air pollution from ammonia in animal wastes in the Netherlands and Denmark due to
concentrated cattle and hog facilities which have responded to subsidies in the livestock
sector.  In addition, pesticide residues and high nitrate levels in drinking water in many
areas of Europe have pushed drinking water contamination levels beyond those
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) and sometimes past the maximum
acceptable levels set by WHO.  Surface and groundwater quality have also fallen for non-
drinking uses.  "Among the most disturbing developments," the FAO report noted, "are the
growing presence of nitrates and pesticide residues in deep water aquifers; changing of
groundwater levels as a result of irrigation and drainage; contamination of shellfish and
other forms of aquatic life; and eutrophication of both fresh and marine water bodies from
phosphates and nitrates" [in fertilizer].
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56. The policies giving rise to these effects are primarily price interventions.  While some
moderation in the level of support has occurred due to the price packages (combined with
inflation) undertaken especially since 1988, the overall signals sent by policy to farmers in
the Community remain strongly in favor of intensive cultivation of cereals and concentrated
livestock production.  Because of growing concern over the environmental consequences of
these interventions, however, a new layer of policies has been imposed on farmers by the
EC and individual member states.
57. In the 1980s the European Community established "environmentally sensitive areas"
(Article 19 Regulation 797/85) and programs for set-aside, extensification and conversion
to woodlands (Regulation 1094/88).  These regulations are also designed to enhance
landscape quality, regarded as an important positive externality from agriculture.  The
pastiche of national regulatory responses varies greatly by country.  Ironically, while most
Community-wide policies amount to "paying the polluter," at the national level, input taxes
have gained favor, and are justified by the polluter pays principle.  Finland, Austria and
Sweden have introduced taxes and levies on fertilizers and pesticides to promote more
environmentally sound management practices, although the revenues have also 19
been used to subsidize crops and exports.  Management agreements are used in
France and Germany in which cash, tax relief or in-kind payments are made for
specific environmental actions, such as reduced nitrogen applications.  At the same
time, many irrigation subsidies remain which have increased cropping in
environmentally sensitive zones.  Other countries have imposed direct bans on some
activities, such as certain insecticides in Belgium while crops are in flower, and straw
burning in Denmark, the Netherlands and (after 1992) in the U.K.  France, Austria,
and Germany are restricting some fertilizer and pesticide use along rivers and
streams.
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58. Despite this panoply of (often contradictory) actions, penalties on agricultural
polluters are rare, and it is doubtful that the environmental policies above can overcome the
powerful incentives represented by crop-specific price interventions.  As the 1990 FAO
study notes, substituting "decoupled" direct income supports for price supports could
"contribute to creating a less intensive, less specialized, and less concentrated agrarian
structure."
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59. Whether input taxes will be successful in reducing use, or will primarily serve as an
additional source of revenue (to be used among other things as a source of export subsidies,
as in Sweden), remains an open question.  While data from some European research
suggests that such taxes are more effective in reducing input use than reductions in output
prices,
48 U.S. research has come to different conclusions.
49  While apparently consistent
with the polluter pays principle, if such input taxes are accompanied by other subsidies or
tax relief as compensation to farmers, or by higher support prices, then the overall impact
on input use will be marginal.  And because they are paid by all farmers, not just the
"polluters," the incentives they create are only superficially consistent with the OECD
polluter pays principle.
60. The set-aside developed by the EC in the late 1980s suffers from problems similar to
those of the CRP in the U.S., on which it is partially modeled.
50  While purportedly targeted
at environmental problems, the program confuses this target with supply reductions. 
Because of producer incentives to retire low productivity land, rather than land especially
vulnerable to environmental damages, the consequence is that neither supply control nor
environmental goals are accurately targeted.  Even within the category of environmental
damages, individual regions and states face widely varying problems to which the set-aside
is not attuned.  In Spain, for example, erosion is more important than groundwater
pollution.  In Portugal, which shares many of these erosion problems, and in which 25
percent of the land under cultivation is estimated to be unsuitable for cropping, the set-aside
has not been implemented at all.
(b)  The Veneto Region and the Need for Targeting
61. The need for both reformed price intervention schemes and more clearly targeted20
environmental policies in the EC is most clear at a more detailed level of analysis.  The
Veneto region of Italy provides a useful case in point.  The Po and Brenta Rivers empty
into the Adriatic after flowing through some of the richest and most productive farmland in
Europe.  Their terminus is a large marsh and lagoon on which medieval Venice was
constructed, and which served as habitat for a wide variety of land and sea creatures for
much of its history.  Tidal action and the flow of these rivers together cleansed the system
and allowed Venice to use the ocean and lagoons as a sink for its own wastes for centuries
without serious environmental impacts.  Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, however,
several developments conspired to create what is now an environmental crisis.  First,
construction of refineries and highways blocked the tidal flow in and out of the lagoons,
causing stagnation and eutrophication.  Second, population pressures increased along the
coast.  Third, and perhaps least well understood, the farmland in the Po and Brenta basins
began to receive levels of fertilizer and chemicals unprecedented in the thousands of years
of their cultivation.  These input applications were derived in part from the increasing
specialization and concentration of crops grown in response to intervention prices under the
Common Agricultural Policy.  Between 1960-61 and 1980-81 average nitrogen applications
per hectare of farmland in Italy rose from 15.6 units to 57.5 units, or by 268 percent.
51 
Average fertilizer applications to maize in Italy in 1979-81 were calculated as 518 units,
compared with 297 units in the U.S., 405 units in France and 540 units in Germany.  The
intensity of maize production in Italy, much of it grown in the Po basin, thus employed
nearly twice the levels of fertilizer as in the U.S.  As a proportion of total costs of
production, the Veneto region's farmers paid 32.0 percent of total costs for fertilizers in
1975, and slightly less, 28.5 percent, by 1984.
52  Agricultural use of phosphorus, often the
limiting nutrient leading to algae blooms and eutrophication was 1-2 kilograms per hectare
per year in Italy in the 1980s, compared with 0.3 kilograms on non-agricultural and forest
lands and 0.75 kilograms in urban areas.  Nitrogen use in Italian agriculture was 8.25
kilograms per hectare per year, compared with 4 kilograms on non-agricultural and forest
lands and 15 kilograms in urban use.
53  The concentration levels of nitrogen, phosphorus
and potassium in the Veneto are shown in Maps 1, 2 and 3, which are drawn from a 1990
final report of the regional impact of agriculture on environmental quality.
54  The outwash
of these nutrients is a major cause of high levels of surface water pollution, eutrophication,
and groundwater contamination in the region.
62. When data for the Veneto were analyzed in greater detail, focusing specifically on
subregions, several important conclusions emerged.  First, the application levels of the
above nutrients were major determinants of pollution.  Second, they were significantly
correlated with the crops grown (notably highly subsidized maize and sugar beets).  Third,
they varied substantially by geophysical land unit.
55  These results parallel findings in the
U.S., where pollution from fertilizers and agricultural chemicals is shown to be significantly
related to the type of crops grown and their rotations, and land surface and subsurface
characteristics.
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63. The overall implications of this body of research are that distortions of agricultural21
markets leading to specialized and intensive cultivation of subsidized crops provides a
major impetus to agricultural pollution.  Second, even if these pressures were reduced
through agricultural policy reforms, effective environmental policy in agriculture will
require more highly targeted interventions focusing on specific attributes of land surfaces
and subsurfaces.  The need for both policy reforms in agriculture and highly targeted
environmental interventions in the Veneto region confirms the intuition provided by the
model in Section II, but underscores how far current policies are from this objective.
B.  EXAMPLES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
64. In developing countries, farmers are typically taxed rather than subsidized, in the
form of food prices held below market levels in response to the political influence of urban
consumers.
57  While depressing production, these policies do not necessarily conserve
natural resources, for two reasons.  First, poor farmers are often compelled to farm
marginal lands subject to erosion and runoff, or to clear forests which have held soil in
place, in order to earn a subsistence level of income.  If the household is already operating
at or near subsistence, lower prices do not cause reduced output.  Second, subsidies are
sometimes paid to reduce the costs of farm inputs (fertilizer, chemicals) which lead to
overapplications and consequent water and soil contamination.  While fertilizer, in
particular, has been vital to meeting food demands, many government policies have had
untoward effects on the environment.  Although insufficient research is available, several
studies suggest that the impacts of government policy in developing countries are at least as
important as in developed countries, both in distorting trade and harming the environment.
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65. While all of the market failures associated with agriculture in the developed countries
are replicated in the developing world, the incapacity of government to intervene effectively
to regulate the environment is even more evident.  Environmental quality is a "superior
good," the demand for which rises increasingly in proportion to increases in income.  By
contrast, food production is an "inferior good," the demand for which falls in proportion to
increases in income (Engels' Law).
59  In the high-income developed countries, for example,
regulations affecting pesticide use have become more stringent in the last two decades. 
Food quality increasingly dominates food quantity as concerns over environmental health
and safety grow.  In low-income developing countries, by contrast, the political and
economic constituencies of most interest to governments are composed of urban consumers
of food who demand low prices.  Environmental quality has a weaker constituency.  Food
producers are a large and politically unorganized source of revenues, and are thus generally
taxed, in large part by extracting their product at below market prices.  In partial
compensation, input subsidies are paid to increase yields.  In some cases, these subsidies
may be justified to maintain soil fertility through nutrient applications.  In other cases, the
environmental effects are clearly negative.
66. The trade impacts of these trends on input use and environmental quality in22
developing countries are worth noting.  Consider sales of pesticides.  By 1986, the U.S.
pesticide industry exported 34 percent of its total sales value ($1.4 billion) compared with
26 percent in 1965.  Pesticide imports by developing countries grew from $328 million in
1967 to $1,489 million in 1986, or by roughly 350 percent.
60  In developing countries, these
inputs are aggressively marketed and subsidized, yet farm level education (including the
basic literacy necessary to read package instructions) is often lacking.  Human poisoning in
developing countries due to overapplication is common, but poorly documented.  One
estimate in seven countries of Central America was that pesticide poisonings occurred at a
rate 1,800 times higher than in the U.S.
61  In Columbia, Repetto (1985) found that pesticide
subsidies as a percentage of full retail costs were 56 percent, in Honduras 71 percent, and
Ecuador 59 percent.  In Africa, the same study found pesticide subsidies in Senegal of 11
percent, Ghana of 33 percent, and in Egypt 17 percent.  In Indonesia and China, the
subsidies were 18 and 81 percent respectively, for an overall average of roughly 50
percent.
62  In the Indonesia case, application levels were so high that crop damage was
done, and yields actually were falling until subsidies were scaled back.
67. It has become popular in some circles to ascribe these adverse environmental effects
to trade itself, and by implication to suggest that trade liberalization would cause further
environmental damages in developing countries.  This reasoning argues against trade reform
because it produces greater "dependency" by the South on the North, as well as greater
environmental damages.  It implies that greater self-sufficiency and protectionism would be
"better" for the environment.
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68. Yet careful evaluation of these claims suggests a different interpretation.  In
Indonesia, for example, the primary motivation for excessive fertilizer and chemical input
applications was self-sufficiency in rice.  As an analyst of Indonesian policy put it:  "food
self sufficiency is neither inherently more nor inherently less environmentally sustainable
than export oriented agricultural development."
64  Many developing countries have
encouraged clearing of marginal land subject to environmental degradation for the
production of both export crops and domestic food supplies.  The incentives giving rise to
these unsustainable practices reflect both domestic policies of taxation for the farm sector,
and the protectionism of wealthy developed countries.  Farmers in developing countries
face low prices caused by a combination of their own domestic distortions (taxes),
reinforced by developed country policies which close off market access and depress
agricultural prices through subsidized exports of surpluses.  In order to maintain per capita
levels of living at the household level in the face of population growth, and to repay debt
obligations at the national level, these countries are often obliged to "borrow from the
future" by mining their soil, water, forest and mineral resources at levels unsustainable in
the longer run.  As a recent UNCTAD background paper noted:
The major cause of unsustainable land use in the agricultural
sector in developing countries is the inappropriate incentive structure
under which both the export crop sector and the domestic food supply23
sector are operating.  In many developing countries, the agricultural
sector is heavily taxed or otherwise controlled to generate revenue for
industrial expansion and to suppress the cost of living of the urban
poor...  These problems are worsened by increased agricultural
protectionism in developed countries and their subsidization of food
exports that compete with certain developing country commodities such
as rice, sugar, soya beans and maize.
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69. The adverse environmental impacts of agriculture in developing countries are thus
tied to their agricultural income problems which arise from both domestic and international
trade distortions.  In order to resolve these interrelated dilemmas, three types of policy
reforms would have to occur together.  First, developing countries would have to be
prepared to reform domestic policies which tax farmers and lower incentives to produce. 
Second, developed countries must be prepared to open market access to developing
country exports, and to reduce the level of surpluses and export subsidies used to dump
these surpluses on world markets.  Together, these two reforms would lead to higher prices
and expanded commodity trade for developing country agricultural producers, resulting in
income growth (see Section V).  Given this increase in growth per capita (assuming that
debt burdens do not draw off these gains), developing countries would then be positioned
to undertake the third measure:  the expensive regulatory task of environmental intervention
now only beginning in the OECD countries, in which lands sensitive to environmental
damages are protected from unsustainable practices.
70. It would be naive to suppose that these three reforms can be accomplished over a
short period.  Current preferential trading arrangements between developed and developing
countries, for example, have encouraged production patterns which are detrimental in the
long run both to balanced trade and environmental protection, but will require time in order
to be dismantled.  Preferential treatment of tapioca imports from Thailand and beef from
Botswana in the EC have both been associated with soil and water depletion in those
countries, yet the EC maintains these arrangements.  In the case of tapioca, a primary
beneficiary is the pig industry of the Netherlands, which has expanded due to the attractive
feed prices it receives under the arrangement.  This industry is a prime example of the
problems of concentrated animal wastes resulting from bought-in feeds.
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71. In sum, policies in both developing and developed countries must change so that both
income growth and environmental quality are given equal weight.  It will be argued in
Section V that there is an important relationship between the income potentially generated
by the liberalization effect of domestic agricultural policy and trade reform in agriculture,
and the ability of developing countries to develop meaningful programs of environmental
intervention, capturing the welfare benefits of environmental improvements.  For example,
Messina and Seale (1990) note that in the case of the U.S. sugar program, a modest
adjustment in the quota granted to Carribean Basin nations would have greater impact than
all of the U.S. Carribean Basin Initiative spending of the last ten years.  As the 199124
UNCTAD document stated:
The adjustment of existing production and trade patterns and the
introduction of sustainable resource management practices not only
takes time, it also has to be financed.  Poverty and financial constraints
can only be overcome by more economic growth and this implies
increasing pressure on the resource base.
However, increasing environmental pressures due to economic
growth can hardly be used as an argument against open markets in the
developed world because the aggregate effect of prolongation of existing
trade protection would be even worse.  The challenge is to offset as
much as possible negative impacts of economic growth by more effective
and efficient resource management and conservation practices.
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Although problems of government failure will continue to plague the implementation of
environmental policy in developing countries, an even deeper issue is this:  Whereas large
developed countries can presumably choose to implement either domestic agricultural and
trade reform and/or environmental interventions, developing countries are unlikely to be
able to afford meaningful environmental programs without the income growth that domestic
agricultural and international trade reform can bring.
IV. PROJECTED IMPACTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN AGRICULTURE
72. The analysis of previous sections has suggested that reforms in agricultural policy are
generally likely to be consistent with improvements in environmental quality.  Yet, as
Section II emphasized, without accompanying environmental interventions, agricultural
policy reforms will not necessarily lead to improvements in net welfare.  This section tests
this claim more rigorously, considering recent empirical evidence on the projected
environmental consequences of domestic agricultural and trade policy reform.  It focuses
first on the U.S., then on more global models of the process, with emphasis on the relative
interests of developed and developing countries.  Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on
specific areas is currently inadequate.
73. Nonetheless, the available research strongly supports the positive impacts of
agricultural trade liberalization on environmental quality, particularly in developed
countries.  This result is not surprising if the argument above is valid:  That trade
distortions in developed countries have their roots in domestic policies which have
reinforced environmental damages.  However, both the type of agricultural policy reforms,
and the combination of these reforms with particular environmental interventions, will
determine the overall impact.  These issues will be taken up in more detail in Section V
below.25
74. An interesting duality in the situations of developed and developing countries
emerges from the analysis.  Whereas developed countries increasingly find relatively strong
public support for environmental quality goals, their policies of protection and subsidy to a
relatively few, rich farmers have thusfar resisted change.  In developing countries, these
priorities are generally reversed:  a relatively small constituency exists for environmental
quality goals, and policies of taxation are applied to a large, poor and unresisting
agricultural sector.  One of the most potentially constructive effects of the interdependence
of trade and environmental issues is that in developed countries, accompanying
environmental interventions can help to "sell" trade reform in agriculture to a broader
public.  In developing countries, on the other hand, the benefits of trade reform, including
market access, higher prices and expanded exports, can help these nations "buy" needed
environmental improvements.
A.  DEVELOPED COUNTRIES:  THE U.S. CASE
75. In Section III, brief reference was given to an empirical study undertaken by a team
from the World Resources Institute (WRI).
68  By carefully examining the impacts of current
policies at the farm level, using data from Nebraska and Pennsylvania case studies, the
researchers were able clearly to document the environmental damages encouraged by
current policies.  They then went beyond the current situation to simulate the effects on
these farms of multilateral trade liberalization, among other options.
76. The trade liberalization simulation was based on the multilateral "decoupling" of
commodity programs tied to production, defined as the elimination of current price support
payments, with supports converted to direct income payments not tied to specific crops. 
The scenario also assumed that all major trading countries eliminate import barriers and
export subsidies.  This simulation led to an increase in prices, and exports, similar to the
situation modelled in Figure 1(b).  These results were based on the compilation and
synthesis of various studies of liberalization developed by Blandford (1990).
69  What is
remarkable about the WRI study is that in addition to the "liberalization effect," they also
included estimates of the "environmental effect" utilizing a natural resource accounting
framework in which the negative external effects of soil depreciation due to erosion and off-
site costs due to water pollution were "internalized."  This accounting framework is one of
the few empirical examples of the polluter pays principle applied to production incentives in
agriculture.
77. Table 1 shows the effect of natural resource accounting when the benefits of baseline
(1985) policies were estimated in terms of net farm income on the Pennsylvania farm,
assuming conventional maize-soybean rotation.  Column 1 shows a typical analysis of net26
farm income, in which soil erosion costs (soil depreciation) are excluded from the analysis. 
As a consequence, the gross and net margins are both $45, given simply as crop sales less
variable production costs.  Government subsidies of $35 are then added (giving an
indication of their relative importance in a conventional rotation scenario) adding to $80. 
In contrast, Column 2 shows what happens when a "soil depreciation allowance" of $25 per
acre is subtracted (based on estimates from USDA data of the present value of future soil
productivity losses).  With the same government payments, net farm income falls by over 30
percent to $55.
78. When viewed from a broader social perspective, however, the polluter pays principle
requires that both  on-farm and off-farm costs of soil erosion must be internalized.  Full
internalization of these costs would account for negative off-farm effects including
sedimentation and water pollution.  Table 2 shows the effect of including these costs in the
net economic value (to society) of production by the Pennsylvania farm.  Government
subsidies are not included, since they are simply transfers.  When the total in Column 1 of
Table 1 (Net Farm Income Without Natural Resource Accounting) is compared with the
total in Column 2 of Table 2 (Net Economic Value With Natural Resource Accounting),
what appears at the farm level to be a per acre gain of $80 appears to society to be a per
acre loss of $27.  This measures the "wedge" between private and social cost accounting
when externalities are present.
79. This framework was applied to simulate a variety of different crop rotation
possibilities, as well as four policy scenarios, for both the Pennsylvania and Nebraska farms. 
As noted above, in both case studies, "a policy of multilateral decoupling produces the
greatest net economic value of any of the policy alternatives considered."
70  Tables 3 and 4
present the results of multilateral decoupling for a variety of different crop rotations on the
Pennsylvania and Nebraska farms.  The Pennsylvania table shows a "transition period" and
a "normal period" corresponding to field data which indicate that changes in crop rotations
affect yields at first slowly (or even negatively) and then assume a more normal pattern. 
Even more significant than the effect of liberalization on net economic value is that, when
the external costs of soil erosion are internalized, greater incentives exist to switch to crop
rotations which are more soil conserving.  This is especially true in Pennsylvania where soil
loss damages are greatest.  This clearly illustrates the reinforcing character of the
"liberalization effect" and "environmental effect."
80. In Pennsylvania, where soils are shallow and the terrain is hilly, fertilizer and farm
chemicals drain rapidly into streams that feed urban water supplies.  The resource
conserving practice (labelled ACG and ACGF, coupled with reduced tillage) emerge as
comparable with conventional methods under a regime of trade liberalization through
multilateral decoupling.  In Nebraska, where soils are deep, the terrain is relatively flat, and
population is less dense, the costs of fertilizer and farm chemical runoff are lower.  Even so,
"alternatives to the predominant high input, corn bean rotation were found to be
environmentally superior and economically competitive," under trade liberalization,27
although corn-bean rotations remain "economically superior."
71  Nebraska, a major
exporting state, illustrates that a continuing comparative advantage in maize and soybeans
can be combined with reduced environmental damages under multilateral decoupling. 
Together, the two case studies show why differences in vulnerability to erosion and
productivity demand carefully targeted environmental interventions.  In addition, the study
noted that once the "transition period" is over, a combination of trade reform and altered
rotations of crops with direct income support payments made to farmers will require much
lower levels of transfer payments, yielding substantial budget savings.
81. In summary, the WRI study concluded that:
Multilateral decoupling provides the greatest net economic value
of the policies we tested.  The simple fact that income support is not tied
to commodity production allows market signals to reach farmers,
encouraging them to use their resources in ways that are inherently more
efficient.  In areas with high resource costs, farmers who take a long
view would likely shift to resource-conserving rotations, while in regions
with low resource costs, farmers would shift to less chemical-intensive
methods.
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These results depend, as emphasized, on the fact that the external effects of intensive
agricultural practices are internalized in farm level decisions as a result of environmental
policies, so that farmers "take the long view."  Yet, the report notes that current U.S.
environmental policies do not accomplish this.
Environmentalists in particular should recognize that the answer to
agriculture's environmental problems is not to tie on more regulations
and cross-compliance provisions but to make the fundamental incentives
farmers face consistent with the true values of the production systems
available to them.
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B. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES:  INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
82. Only recently have efforts to model the global distribution of gains and losses from
domestic agricultural and trade policy reform been extended to consider impacts on
environmental quality.  A priori analysis has assumed that if liberalization lowered the
relative prices received in developed country markets due to expanded market access and
reduced subsidies, and raised relative prices in developing countries, the pressure on land,
water and labor would fall in the developed countries, but would rise with prices in
developing countries.  While this may in fact occur, some analysts suggest that the increases
in output in developing countries will be more at the extensive margin than in developed
countries, and that excess labor absorbed in commercial agriculture due to output and28
income increases will help to relieve pressure on marginal lands.  This is not to suggest that
either developed or developing countries can be sanguine about the environmental impacts
of trade reform without additional policy interventions, particularly regarding land uses. 
But in the developing countries, income growth is an important precondition for the
investments in environmental regulation required, as well as the emergence of a larger
constituency devoted to improvements in environmental quality.
83. Utilizing historical data from the United States, several researchers at the World
Bank
74 have deduced that trade liberalization would cause rapid short run global
adjustments in fertilizer and pesticide use, and wages of hired labor, and longer run
adjustments in capital and land in agriculture.  In the developed countries, a fall in prices
following liberalization would therefore reduce pressures on the environment.  In addition,
the expected increase in domestic price variation would increase incentives to diversify the
commodity composition of crops grown.  But in developing countries, they argue, higher
prices would largely have the opposite effect.  Using evidence from Brazil, Lutz (1990)
concludes that small farms would respond less than larger farms, but that the larger farms
would dramatically expand production, land and labor use, and input use, with negative
environmental consequences overall.
84. The empirical base on which these projections are made is the application of
historical data from the U.S. in the 1930s to developed countries today, together with
elasticity estimates and a Ph.D. dissertation conducted in the 1970s.  More extensive
empirical analysis of the international distribution of environmental impacts from trade
liberalization in agriculture has recently been undertaken by Anderson
75 based on earlier
modeling work with Tyers.
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85. Making use of a multi-commodity simulation model of world markets in grains,
meats, dairy products and sugar, covering 30 countries, a reference simulation base of 1990
is compared with two scenarios:  (1) liberalization in all developed industrial countries but
not developing countries, and (2) liberalization in both developed and developing countries
(but not Eastern Europe and the USSR).  In both cases, technologically driven shifts in the
aggregate supply function are assumed to be induced by increases in agricultural prices. 
This is an important source of growth in developing countries, leading some net food
importing countries to become net exporters post-liberalization.  The fact that net importers
become net exporters, moving from the situation depicted in Figure 1(a) to Figure 1(b),
subjects them to the ambiguity of welfare effects associated with liberalization unless it is
accompanied by specific environmental interventions.
86. Generally, the impact of liberalization in developed countries only is to raise food
prices by an average of 26 percent, while if both developed and developing countries
liberalize, global food prices would remain essentially unchanged, since declines in
production in the North would be offset by increases in production in the South.  Globally,
grain production would fall and livestock production would increase through more29
pasturing and less bought-in feeds.  Welfare gains would occur for all of the industrial
countries, as well as for most developing countries save those with strong comparative
disadvantages in food production:  Middle East oil producers and newly industrializing
countries of Northeast Asia.  The reason that developing countries do better than often
envisioned in welfare terms is that the price effects of liberalization are allowed to be passed
through to farmers, with induced supply responses the result.
77  These results are
summarized in Table 5.
87. The environmental impacts of these changes are then considered.  Consistent with the
projections of the World Bank studies, variable input use of fertilizer and farm chemicals
would fall substantially in the developed countries, and the commodity mix would become
less narrowly focused on grains and oilseeds.  Citing data on fertilizer use (Tables 6 and 7),
the strong correlation with levels of output prices received discussed above is corroborated
for a cross-section of countries.  By shifting production from developed to developing
countries, not only would fertilizer and chemical use decline in the North, but labor would
be substituted for them in the South, which would reduce substantially the use of chemicals
in world food production.  Shifts to less bought-in feeds in livestock production would also
reduce environmental problems of waste disposal in developed countries, and would move
livestock production to the extensive margin in both developed and developing countries,
with more pasturing, often as a substitute for cereals.  Over the longer term, surplus labor
would be absorbed in a more dynamic commercial farm sector in developing countries.
88. While Lutz' (1990) projects of increased environmental pressures on land, water and
soils in developing countries following liberalization, Anderson argues that an expanding
commercial labor force in agriculture would help reduce in-migration to urban areas,
reducing urban environmental problems.  Land use in commercial agriculture would
increase, but increased agricultural incomes would reduce the incentive of poor subsistence
farmers to cultivate marginal lands or to deforest them for fuelwood, so that "agricultural
trade liberalization per se is unlikely to bring forth wholesale destruction of tropical rain
forests."
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89. Additional evidence of the positive impacts of income growth on expenditures for
environmental improvements has recently been reported by Grossman and Kreuger (1991),
who studied the impacts of income growth in a cross-section of countries on pollution,
finding that at low levels of income, pollution was greatest, but as per capita incomes rose
above $5,000 per annum, pollution levels fell.
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90. This point is reflected in the UNCTAD background paper on environment and North-
South trade relations, which concludes that:
The evidence that agricultural protection in the industrialized
countries is on balance detrimental to sustainable resource management
in developing countries is quite convincing.  World market prices for
agricultural products (excluding typical tropical products such as coffee,
tea and spices) would, on average increase by more than 20 percent if30
industrial market economies eliminated all assistance, without having any
significant effect on consumer prices in these countries...
In both food importing and exporting countries, higher world market
prices are most likely to reduce shifting cultivation and other
unsustainable resource management [practices] because of the possible
increase in added value accruing to the farming sector.
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91. In any event, this global modeling work underscores the analytical point made in
Section II:  liberalization can offer advantages to developing countries which can be
accompanied by targeted environmental interventions aimed specifically at problems of land
use such as deforestation.  This does not imply that liberalization is always and everywhere
likely to have positive environmental effects.  In many areas it may not.  But it may not. 
But it does create the wherewithal to undertake environmental improvements.  Thus,
"because there are more efficient policy instruments than trade policies for preserving the
natural environment, trade liberalization not only need never be put off for environmental
reasons but its benefits can be enhanced if appropriate environmental instruments are
introduced at the time of liberalization."
81  Yet despite this assertion, there are reasons to
believe that from a political perspective, liberalization can be more easily put off if there is
not greater assurance that environmental reforms will accompany the liberalization process.
C.  DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY INTERESTS
92. The relative incapacity of many developing countries to afford the expensive
undertaking of environmental regulation, especially reforms affecting environmentally
vulnerable lands and their use, reemphasizes the relationship between income growth
following liberalization and the capacity to use this "growth dividend" to advance
environmental objectives.  This point is no less valid in developed economies, although
there is already a strong and growing constituency in these countries for environmental
actions.  In the wealthy countries of the North, the problem is less one of creating a
constituency, than of targeting environmental interventions in agriculture accurately and
fairly.  As Section III emphasized, many improvements in programs such as the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the U.S. and set-aside in Europe are possible.  If
anything the resistance in the developed countries is greater against liberalization of trade
than against appropriate environmental policies in agriculture.  But in developing countries,
the problem is less one of refining and targeting environmental interventions than of having
a program of environmental policy at all.
93. It has been argued by some developing country representatives that they therefore
should demand "compensation" in order to undertake such programs as part of the
liberalization process, or that liberalization should occur more slowly in order to protect
certain environmentally sensitive areas.  Yet the analysis above suggests that liberalization31
itself will pay a far higher dividend to most developing countries than any "compensation,"
which in any event is unlikely to be paid.  It is out of this dividend that environmental
interventions can and should be undertaken.  Conversely, the strong support for the
environment in developed countries can provide an important and broad constituency for
trade reform in agriculture, if environmental groups believe that adverse effects of
agriculture will be confronted with the same vigor as trade protectionism.
V. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
INSTRUMENTS:  PRINCIPLES OF MATCHING AND MISMATCHING
94. This section considers the relationship between agricultural and environmental policy
instruments and the targets at which these instruments are aimed.  It extends the analysis of
previous sections beyond the proposition that agricultural trade liberalization and
environmental intervention should be undertaken jointly, to the principles according to
which specific instruments might be employed in each area.  Even if it is granted that trade
instruments are generally best aimed at trade targets, and environmental instruments at their
own targets, the question of what combination of instruments to employ remains.
82  There
may also be exceptions to the matching rule, but how does one decide when such
exceptions are justifiable?  In agriculture, the situation is further complicated by the
domestic origins of trade distortions, which do not allow border measures (trade
instruments) to be manipulated independently of domestic policies.  Finally, it is
unreasonable to suppose that the same combination of policies will be suitable for all
countries.  Not only will developed and developing countries need to employ different
approaches, but different countries within these groups will find different combination
better suited to their political and economic situations.
95. Despite these complexities, principles of policy can be developed to serve as
guidelines for the agricultural sector.  Below, four such principles will be illustrated with
some examples of policies in use.  Together, these principles can serve as a focus of
discussion, and hopefully as a basis for reform.  The first principle simply restates the logic
of matching targets and instruments.  The second two consider agricultural and
environmental policies, respectively, and how the domain of each might reasonably be
determined in practice.  The fourth principle extends this logic to the multilateral setting.
A.  PRINCIPLE ONE:  MATCHING TARGETS AND INSTRUMENTS
96. In general, domestic agricultural and trade targets in agriculture should be matched
with domestic agricultural and trade instruments, and environmental targets with
environmental instruments.  Yet this principle is not inviolate, and some "cross-matching"
may be justified.
97. For the reasons developed above, targets and instruments in agriculture include
domestic price and income supports, output taxes and input subsidies as well as border
measures.  Examples of mismatching include the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program and32
EC set-aside, which by aiming at both supply control and environmental improvements,
have failed to accomplish either as effectively.  By targeting such programs directly at lands
highly vulnerable to environmental damages (in effect converting them purely to
environmental policies), their impacts and cost-effectiveness would both be enhanced.
83  A
second example of a mismatch is Sweden's tax on nitrogen use in agriculture, the proceeds
of which, while purportedly aimed at environmental improvement, have been used to
subsidize grain exports of surpluses resulting from price supports, thus further stimulating
production and nitrogen use.  Austria has followed a similar policy, utilizing proceeds from
its "soil protection fee" to finance grain exports.
84  These examples raise some troubling
questions about input taxes in agriculture to be discussed under Principles 2 and 3 below. 
An example of a trade measure mismatched by being directed at environmental problems is
the subject of a recent GATT and U.S./Canada panel ruling that Canadian landing
restrictions on U.S. salmon and herring fishing boats were not primarily aimed at
environmental targets but were in fact primarily intended as trade restrictions.
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98. The 1989 U.S./Canada case provides insights into what criteria can guide when
"cross-matching" is justifiable, and when it is not.  While the case involved fisheries, its
lessons are generalizable to agricultural policies, insofar as it concerns whether specific
trade restriction policies are structured "proportionately" to achieve "legitimate objectives"
of environmental protection.
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99. The case involved a panel established to hear testimony over Canadian restrictions on
exports of Pacific Coast unprocessed salmon and herring.  Such restrictions date to 1908,
but were found GATT-illegal in 1987 after the United States complained that they were
unjustifiable restrictions on trade.  In 1988, Canada accepted the GATT finding, but stated
that it would continue a "landing" requirement for foreign boats which would allow
inspection of their catch.  The ostensible reason for the requirement was an environmental
one:  to allow the fish harvest to be counted and monitored so as to preserve the fishery
from overexploitation.
100. According to the United States, the requirement that its boats must land in Canada
constituted an export restriction, because of the extra time and expense U.S. boats must
incur in landing and unloading, as well as due to dockage fees and product deterioration. 
The Canadians held that they were pursuing "conservation and management goals" for five
varieties of salmon (some of which had previously not been covered by the landing
requirement) as well as herring.  Essentially, the Canadians sought to justify under Article
XX of the GATT (the "General Exceptions" Section:  to be considered further below) what
had otherwise been found GATT-illegal, by appealing to an environmental claim under
Article XX(g):  conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
101. The U.S. argued that although the new herring and salmon regulations "are carefully
worded to avoid the appearance of creating direct export prohibitions or restrictions, their
clear effect is to restrict exports."  Moreover, the Canadian landing requirement was argued33
not to be "primarily aimed" at the conservation of herring and salmon stocks, which had
been the interpretation given to Article XX(g) by the 1987 GATT ruling.  Thus, the U.S.
held that the Canadian landing requirement was being justified as an environmental policy
when it was primarily no more than an unwarranted restriction on international trade. 
Canada argued that the landing requirement was "primarily aimed" at the conservation of
the salmon and herring fisheries.
102. In a significant decision, the panel found that if the effect of such a measure is to
impose "a materially greater commercial burden on exports than on domestic sales," it
amounted to a restriction on trade, whether or not its trade effects could be quantitatively
demonstrated.  The panel "was satisfied that the cost of complying with the landing
requirement would be more than an insignificant expense for those buyers who would have
otherwise shipped directly from the fishing ground to a landing site in the United States." 
With regard to the Article XX(g) exception, the panel was conscious "of the need to allow
governments appropriate latitude in implementing their conservation policies," and that the
trade interests of one state should not be allowed to override the "legitimate environmental
concerns of another."  "If the measure would have been adopted for conservation reasons
alone," the panel found, "Article XX(g) permits a government the freedom to employ it." 
However, balancing this is the "primarily aimed at" test, which determines whether the
measure is part of a genuine conservation or environmental policy, or is in fact primarily
intended as a barrier to trade.
103. This line of reasoning led the panel to two conclusions.  First, "since governments do
not adopt conservation measures unless the benefits to conservation are worth the costs,"
the magnitude of costs to the parties--foreign and domestic--who actually bear them must
be examined.  Second, "how genuine the conservation purpose of a measure is, must be
determined by whether the government would have been prepared to adopt that measure if
its own nationals had to bear the actual costs of the measure."  In this case, the panel was
unconvinced that the measure would have been imposed on all Canadian boats primarily for
conservation reasons.  Specifically, the panel found that Canada would not have adopted
such a measure "if it had required an equivalent number of Canadian buyers to land and
unload elsewhere than at their intended destination."  Alternative methods of monitoring
catch rates were available which posed far fewer restrictions on trade.
104. Generalizing from this case, it seems possible to envision the development of criteria
based on (a) estimated costs of trade restrictions justified as environmental regulations; (b)
evidence on who bears these costs; and (c) judgments of whether such measures would be
imposed domestically, in the absence of any trade effects.  Such criteria can serve as a basis
for the development of standards determining which environmental and health measures
constitute unnecessary obstacles to trade.
105. Consider a specific example arising from the 1989 United States decision to embargo
Chilean fruit and vegetable imports after traces of cyanide were found in two grapes. 34
Would the costs imposed on Chile by a complete embargo have been imposed on domestic
U.S. interests if two California grapes had been adulterated?  In estimating these costs, and
their trade effects, differences in national levels of living must also come into play.  Since
Canadian and U.S. fishing interests are in the main a homogenous group, the problem does
not arise.  Where measures promulgated in one country loom much larger in relation to
incomes in another (e.g., Chile and the U.S.), an a priori argument for a differentiated
approach exists.
B. PRINCIPLE TWO:  AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND TRADE TARGETS AND
INSTRUMENTS
106. Agricultural policies (including domestic instruments affecting output and inputs)
should aim to minimize distortion of market signals, while remaining environmentally
neutral.  If these policies nonetheless create (or fail to reduce) adverse environmental
impacts, then a separate environmental intervention should be addressed to the problem.
107. It follows from the previous sections that developed countries will have greater
ability to reduce trade distortions in the form of both import barriers and export subsidies if
their domestic policies are targeted at maintaining farm incomes directly, rather than via
crop-specific price supports.  In addition, subsidies paid to inputs which are scarce natural
resources (e.g., water) should be reduced or eliminated.  For example, if the U.S. or EC
were to move dramatically in the direction of "decoupling" payments to farmers from
specific crop "bases" (in the U.S.) or quantities (in Europe) substantially greater targeting
efficiency would be possible to smaller- and medium-sized farmers.
87  Yet despite the fact
that such policies would reduce incentives to intensify production and thus environmentally
harmful agricultural practices, it would be naive to suppose that they will be sufficient to
eliminate adverse environmental impacts from agriculture.  Additional policies targeted
specifically at harmful agricultural practices and vulnerable lands will be necessary since
market failures will persist.  These environmental instruments will be more efficient if they
are targeted directly at the problem, rather than operating obliquely such as "cross
compliance" measures and the U.S. "sodbuster" and "swampbuster" programs, which are
tied to crop-specific subsidies.
108. In developing countries policies which now tax the farm sector should instead allow
price incentives to be passed through from markets to producers.  Without such price
depressing taxes, input subsidies will be less necessary.  Income growth per capita will
result, especially if greater market access is granted due to simultaneous reforms in
developed countries.  Again, however, substantial environmental interventions will continue
to be necessary, which will become more affordable if incomes per capita increase.35
C.  PRINCIPLE THREE:  ENVIRONMENTAL TARGETS AND INSTRUMENTS
109. Environmental policies in agriculture should aim to minimize distortions in the use of
natural resources due to market failure, while remaining trade neutral.  If these polices
nonetheless create trade distortions, then separate trade policy interventions should be
addressed to them.
110. Minimizing distortions due to market failure by internalizing agricultural externalities,
even with the agricultural policy reforms discussed under Principle Two, will require
substantially greater interventions than undertaken to date.  The polluter pays principle,
which has thusfar been applied mainly through input taxes (e.g., on nitrogen) should instead
focus primarily on graduated fees and penalties for a wide array of environmental damages. 
These should be targeted to individual land owners (including corporations and absentee
land owners) found to have engaged in (or failed to prevent) environmentally harmful
practices as defined by the regulatory authority.  In contrast to input taxes levied on all
users, such policies would focus specifically on the polluter.  They would probably generate
less revenue than input taxes, but this would decrease the temptation to funnel this revenue
to perverse uses (e.g., export subsidies) and would reduce calls for farmer compensation,
both of which undercut the efficacy of the polluter pays principle.
111. In addition to a system of graduated fees and penalties paid by land owners, land
areas targeted because they are vulnerable to a variety of environmental damages should
become the primary focus of land retirement schemes such as the CRP in the U.S. and set-
aside in Europe.  Restrictions on farming practices on these lands, which would trigger fees
and penalties if violated, are within the administrative capacity of most governments. 
Although such intervention schemes are subject to political interpretation, they are far less
likely to be abused than tax schemes which generate large flows of funds.  In both
developed and developing countries, the designation of protected land areas together with
fees and penalties may not work well, but it will work better than a scheme of input taxes,
which will be afflicted with the same problems of favoritism and corruption that have
hampered the administration of input subsidies.
112. For the same reasons that graduated penalties and fees targeted specifically to
"polluters" in agriculture are more efficient than input taxes, so graduated rewards for
environmental "affirmative actions" can be targeted specifically to farmers willing to
undertake soil and water conservation projects, experiments in input reduction, and other
actions designated as environmentally positive.  It should be emphasized that such rewards
are not simply payments not to pollute, but to improve the quality of the environment from
a current baseline.
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113. If such policies result in trade distortions, then a trade instrument is better able to
resolve the issue.  For example, U.S. vegetable growers have contended that current U.S.
restrictions on pesticide use put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Mexican36
growers, who are subject to more lax restrictions.  Rather than reducing the level of U.S.
regulation, an appropriate response is to negotiate, bilaterally or multilaterally, equivalent
standards in the Mexican case, or to demonstrate that the Mexican standards justify an
import restriction under Article XX of the GATT (see Principle Four).  This has been the
general approach taken in the U.S./Mexico negotiations, in which the promise of greater
market access (and income growth) has impelled an upgrading of some of Mexico's
environmental policies.
114. An interesting instance of a trade measure misapplied to a domestic environmental
problem is the recent pork export charge by the government of Taiwan.
89  A charge of 3.75
U.S. cents per kilogram of whole carcass exported, which will double in 1992, is to finance
regulations designed to put small pig raisers out of business.  Whether the tax will solve the
water pollution problem from pig wastes, or simply concentrate production, aggravating the
problem, remains an open question.  Farm level fees and charges would be more targeted to
the environmental problem than export taxes.
115. Many environmental groups have remained unconvinced that multilateral or bilateral
trade negotiators are able (or willing) to upgrade environmental standards.  At the same
time, developed countries are suspicious of "harmonization" as leading to a "least common
regulatory denominator."  Developing countries, meanwhile, sometimes perceive of
harmonization as a way of closing off market access to their products.  As a result, they
have called on governments to take unilateral actions, such as banning imports of beef
treated with hormones or halting pesticide exports in order to break the "circle of poison." 
In so doing they have allied themselves with protectionist elements.  The growing volume
of agricultural trade suggests that only through the search for greater equivalency in
standards can such problems be addressed.
D. PRINCIPLE FOUR:  MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO MATCHING
TARGETS AND INSTRUMENTS
116. The logic of targets and instruments at the national level, when extended to the
international level, implies that trade will be less distorted, and the global environment more
readily protected, if national governments pursue similar policy targets.  These targets
should be based on the free movement of goods and services and the reduction in global
environment damages.  Both are forms of "public goods."  Thus, multilateral organizations
seek to promote consensus agreements over the objectives of trade and environmental
policy.  This consensus is not a substitute for national policies, nor does agreement on
targets (e.g., chloroflorocarbon emissions) imply that the requisite actions will be
undertaken to alleviate them.
90  A major question, assuming agreement over targets can be
reached, is the degree of uniformity to be sought in instruments.37
117. National governments must be granted the flexibility to achieve similar targets
through different, but "equivalent" instruments.  In agricultural trade policy, the Uruguay
Round has barely reached agreement over targets; it is evident that different instruments
will be required.  To achieve more "decoupled" forms of income support to farmers, for
example, the U.S. will likely pursue greater separation of payments from specific crop
"bases," while the EC will pursue limits on the proportion of output eligible for subsidy. 
Developing countries, even if agreed on less distorting measures of agricultural trade
policy, will seek special and differential treatment.
118. In environmental policy, the issue of harmonization versus equivalency in agriculture
is particularly difficult.
91  While equivalency has greater appeal, insofar as it allows for
different conditions and endowments by countries seeking to achieve similar targets, it is
also subject to disguised protectionism.  This makes the issues of harmonization versus
equivalency, and the degree to which environmental standards constitute effective barriers
to the free movement of goods and services under GATT Articles, an increasingly
important question.
119. There has been longstanding recognition of the possibility for conflicts between
national environmental policy and more liberal international trade.  The GATT Articles,
adopted by the contracting parties in 1947, explicitly recognize the possibility that domestic
health, safety and environmental policies might override general attempts to lower trade
barriers.  GATT Article XI, headed "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions,"
states in paragraph (1):
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
Yet Article XX, headed "General Exceptions," provides
...nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contacting party of measures:
...(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption; provided that such measures:
...are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.38
120. A similar set of exceptions was applied to health related measures under Article
XX(b).  GATT law emphasizes that any restrictions posed on foreign practices for
environmental or health reasons must also reflect a domestic commitment, so that the
exceptions cannot be misused as a disguised form of protection.
121. It would seem necessary to go beyond the language of Article XX, and to develop
principles and protocols to guide national and international judgments about the appropriate
matching of agricultural targets and instruments.  While this may not be possible until after
the Uruguay Round, it is likely to remain a highly visible set of issues.  The U.S./Canada
case cited above provides insights, but these have not been translated into more specific
guidelines.  And as noted, there are important reasons to believe that the level and
enforcement of environmental standards affecting agriculture will not be the same in
developed and developing countries.
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122. Despite the view in some quarters that environmental issues should be kept out of the
trade realm, it is very doubtful that it will be possible to do so as global agricultural trade
becomes more integrated.  While matching targets and instruments provides a basis for
ordering the relationship of agricultural trade and environmental issues, it in no way
suggests that they are, or can be made, independent.  The entire thrust of this analysis is
that they are analytically, economically and politically linked.  The challenge is to clarify
these linkages, and to establish guidelines for actions which jointly pursue trade reform, and
improved environmental quality, in ways that are most efficacious from the point of view of
national governments and the international trading system.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
123. The impacts of trade flows and trade policies on environmental quality in agriculture
are complex and difficult to resolve.  Agriculture is replete with examples of market failure,
yet these externalities and public bads have, until recently, been difficult to monitor and to
estimate.  Government policies in agriculture have tended to reinforce, rather than to
mitigate, these market failures.
124. Failures in agricultural trade policy emanate from domestic price manipulation.  The
same domestic policies which have distorted trade are also responsible for a large share of
the environmental damages in agriculture, especially in developed countries.  While
reforming these policies would not address all of these problems, it would alleviate many
distortions as well as many of the incentives leading to intensive cropping and excessive
input use.
125. Whereas environmental problems may be reinforced by agricultural trade and
domestic policies, they are unlikely to be resolved through changes in these policies alone. 
In fact, if environmental policies internalizing externalities do not accompany trade reform,39
the welfare effects of trade liberalization are ambiguous, and could be negative.  In contrast,
if agricultural policy reform is accompanied by targeted environmental interventions which
largely internalize externalities, the welfare effects will generally be positive.  There is, for
each country, a combination of agricultural and environmental policies which will be most
efficient.
126. The environmental impacts of trade flows in agriculture revolve around two main
issues:  the commodity composition of agricultural trade and the increasing use of water,
fertilizer and chemical inputs.  The composition of crops grown has become increasingly
specialized in high income developed countries since the 1950s, in part in response to
market forces, but also due to subsidies that have sheltered producers of a subset of
commodities from market risks.  These subsidies have generated chronic surpluses of these
commodities well in excess of market demands, creating several economic distortions.  On
the trade side, support prices higher than world market levels have necessitated import
barriers, closing off market access to developing countries capable of lower cost and lower
intensity production.  Chronic surpluses have necessitated export subsidies to clear
domestic markets, lowering world market prices and depressing production in low income
countries.  On the environmental side, the same subsidies have reduced farm level
diversification, contributing to a more narrow range of crops grown, and reduced annual
rotations of grains and oilseeds with other crops that would help replenish soil nutrients,
reduce erosion, and require fewer applications of water, fertilizer and chemicals.  It is the
excessive applications of these inputs, and the effect of these excesses on soil and water
quality that, together with less diversified commodity composition, pose the greatest
environmental challenges in developed countries.  In addition to these problems, the
increasing concentration of livestock production (again in large part a response to a variety
of subsidies) has posed serious problems of waste disposal which were less serious when
diversified crop/livestock production was the norm.
127. In developing countries, the effect of depressed global prices is reinforced by
government policies which tax the agricultural sector and subsidize urban consumers,
lowering incentives to produce.  However, because so much of household production is at
or near subsistence levels, farmers continue to cultivate crops on marginal soils and to
deforest environmentally vulnerable lands.  The environmental damages on these lands are
aggravated by policies which seek to increase yields by subsidizing fertilizer and chemical
inputs.  Excessive applications of these inputs results, with adverse impacts on soil, water
and human health.
128. The policies underlying these problems in both developed and developing countries
have powerful constituencies:  wealthy farmers in the North, and urban consumers in the
South.  Yet the policies are the creation of governments, and can be changed by them if the
political and economic logic of reform is compelling.  In developed countries, concern with
the environment has the potential to broaden the constituency for agricultural trade reform,
if environmental groups are persuaded that trade liberalization and environmental responses40
to market failure in agriculture will be jointly and vigorously pursued.  In developing
countries, the willingness to undertake environmental initiatives is conditional on the
income growth that only agricultural trade liberalization, coupled with reduced taxation of
farmers, can bring.  Without access to industrial country markets it is unrealistic to expect
developing countries to undertake a process of environmental regulation of agriculture, a
process which is really only beginning in the OECD countries.
129. In most developed countries, environmental policies affecting agriculture continue to
operate at the margin, and are overwhelmed by price subsidies coupled to specific crops.  If
a program of "decoupling" were to emerge from the trade liberalization process, or in
response to budget pressures domestically, the effect on the environment would be salutary. 
But environmental regulations themselves would still be required, aimed at better targeting
of lands and soils highly vulnerable to damages from agriculture, and more refined
applications of the polluter pays principle.  The current impetus toward input taxes in
agriculture is a crude application of the principle, which taxes all users, not only or even
necessarily the polluters.  Graduated fees and penalties to be paid by polluting land owners,
together with rewards for environmental affirmative actions, are more consistent with the
principle.  In addition, land targeting making use of information available on soil and water
use could help to bring the penalties and awards to bear on the areas most in need of
attention.
130. In developing countries, it is less a question of refining and targeting environmental
policies in agriculture, than of developing such policies at all.  Those policies are expensive
to undertake, and will require investments which are unlikely without income growth. 
Income growth, as noted, is linked in turn to trade reform.
131. The empirical evidence on the environmental effects of domestic agricultural and
trade policy reform in developed and developing countries is not large, and is quite recent. 
However, several studies point to the positive empirical validity of not only the
"liberalization effect," but the reinforcing character of the "environmental effect," on
welfare.  In a detailed case study of the United States, multilateral decoupling, as called for
in the Uruguay Round, has a beneficial effect on farm income which reinforces incentives to
move to more sustainable agronomic practices.  In recent global models of trade
liberalization, welfare benefits are widespread, creating the wherewithal for targeted
environmental improvements in developing countries.  The shift in production to the
extensive margin, and the absorption of labor in commercial agriculture, also may have
positive environmental impacts in developing countries.  This does not suggest that
environmental problems will be overcome by liberalization per se, but that the opportunity
to confront them effectively will be enhanced with higher incomes.  The dividend from trade
reform is much greater than any compensation likely to be paid to developing countries for
environmental improvement.
132. Given that agricultural policy reform and environmental improvements are both41
welfare enhancing, what principles can guide the application of specific policy instruments
to these targets?  First, it is important to remember that while generally mutually
reinforcing, they are separate targets of policy, requiring separate instruments.  Where
environmental instruments aim at domestic agricultural and trade targets, or domestic
agricultural and trade instruments at environmental targets, the result is likely to be
inefficiency due to some combination of political manipulation, ineffectiveness, or
protectionism.  Yet there may be cases in which such "cross-matching" is justified. 
Restraints on trade in order to protect environmental quality may be justified if they are
primarily aimed at an environmental target, and not a disguised form of tariff or subsidy to
trade.  One way in which to determine this is to ask whether the costs of the policy would
have been incurred if they were fully borne by domestic, rather than foreign interests. 
Conversely, if an environmental policy is aimed at foreign interests, would the costs
proposed for the foreign interests also be borne fully in the home market?
133. A second principle, applicable to domestic agricultural and trade targets and
instruments, is that they should aim to minimize distortions of market signals, while
remaining environmentally neutral.  If environmental problems remain, they should be
addressed directly.  This principle reinforces the separation of these targets, but does not
imply that environmental objectives are residual, to be considered after the fact.  The
welfare analysis of Section II makes it clear that instruments employed to achieve
environmental objectives are in fact a sine quo non for welfare improvements from
liberalization.
134. A third principle is that environmental policies in agriculture should aim to minimize
distortions in the use of natural resources due to market failure, while remaining trade
neutral.  If trade distortions result, then separate instruments should be addressed to them. 
The most effective way to minimize market failures is by targeted application of the polluter
pays principle.
135. Finally, the relationship between the agricultural and environmental targets and
instruments of many countries, acting together, must be considered.  If these targets are
largely similar (the minimization of trade distortions and market failures) then the
coordination of policies is likely to be easier.  Even so, it is unrealistic to expect the
instruments used to be the same.  For this reason, equivalent, rather than strictly
harmonized, instrumental approaches are likely to be more practical.
136. In the final analysis, the increasing integration of world markets continues to tie the
interests of various nations more closely together.  The flow of agricultural goods and
services will be rationalized, and human welfare most improved, if unfettered by outmoded
policies designed to protect special interests.  At the same time, the costly flow of "bads"
and "disservices," the environmental consequences of market failure, are also increasingly in
evidence.  A corresponding effort to staunch this flow through policies which acknowledge
and account for these costs is an equal requirement of global market integration.42
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Table 1











Gross Operating Margin 45 45





Government Subsidy 35 35
Net Farm Income 80 55
(a)Pennsylvania Case Study using conventional corn-soybean rotation under baseline (1985)
policies.  Net farm income defined as crop sales less variable production costs.
(b)See Faeth, et. al. (1991), Appendix B, p. 62.
Source:  See Faeth, et. al. (1991), Table 14, p. 33.67
Table 2











Gross Operating Margin 45 45





Off-Farm Costs - -45
(c)
Net Economic Value - -27
(a)Pennsylvania Case Study using conventional corn-soybean rotation under baseline (1985)
policies.
(b)See Faeth, et. al. (1991), Appendix B, p. 62.
(c).See Faeth, et. al. (1991), Appendix A, p. 61
Source:  Faeth, et. al. (1991), Table 14, p. 33.68
Table 3
INCREASE IN NET ECONOMIC VALUE POSSIBLE
FROM A MOVE TO MULTILATERAL DECOUPLING
(a)
Pennsylvania
Net Economic Value (NEV) and Increase in Net Economic Value
               Conventional Tillage     Reduced Tillage






(C) (132) (88) 5 (510) (112) (58) 41
MLDC NEV (307) 19 10 55 233 40 43 92
Increase (175) 151 142 187 (101) 172 175 224





(919) (61) 208 345 (796) (23) 264 413
MLDC NEV (359) 251 438 466 (222) 290 500 536





(344) 71 296 340 (286) 89 322 372
MLDC NEV (52) 232 428 411 11 250 457 444
Increase (123) 161 357 340 (60) 179 386 373
CC       - Conventional continuous corn
CCBCB - Conventional corn-beans
ACG     - Alternative Cash Grain--Organic corn-barley/soybean-wheat/clover-corn-soybeans
ACGF   - Alternative Cash Grain w/Fodder--Organic corn-beans-wheat/clover-clover-corn
silage
MLDC  - Multilateral Decoupling
(a)Increases (or decreases) in Net Economic Value for each rotation are based on the most profitable conventional
rotation--the corn-beans rotation (CCBCB)--under baseline policy.  The table shows the result of a movement from
CCBCB under baseline policy to the given rotation under multilateral decoupling.
(MLDC NEVROTATION - Baseline NEVCCBCB = IncreaseROTATION)
These calculations assume output prices as in Table 4 of Faeth, et. al. (1991) for Multilateral Decoupling.
(b)Normal period values have been discounted.
(c)Figures in parenthesis are negative.
Source:  Faeth, et. al. (1991), Table 6, p. 14.69
Table 4
INCREASE IN NET ECONOMIC VALUE POSSIBLE
FROM A MOVE TO A MULTILATERAL DECOUPLING
(a)
Nebraska
Net Economic Value and Change in Net Economic Value
($/acre/4 years)
CC HFCB FOCB ORGCB HFROT FOROT ORGROT
Baseline
NEV
72 480 483 474 348 344 340
MLDC
NEV
250 561 561 553 458 449 445
Increase (233)
(b) 78 78 70 (25) (34) (38)
CC          - Conventional continuous corn
HFCB      - Conventional corn-beans, w/herbicides and fertilizer
FOCB      - Corn-beans w/fertilizer but no herbicides
ORGCB   - Organic corn-beans
HFROT   - Corn-beans-corn-oats/clover w/herbicides and fertilizer
FOROT    - Corn-beans-corn-oats/clover w/fertilizer but no herbicides
ORGROT  - Organic corn-beans-corn-oats/clover
MLDC     - Multilateral Decoupling
(a)Increases (or decreases) in Net Economic Value for each rotation are based on the most
profitable conventional rotation--the fertilizer-only corn-beans rotation (FOCB)--under baseline
policy.  The table shows the result of a movement from FOCB under baseline policy to the given
rotation under multilateral decoupling.
(MLDC NEVROTATION ! Baseline NEVFOCB = IncreaseROTATION)
These calculations assume output prices as in Table 4 of Faeth, et. al. (1991 for Multilateral
Decoupling.
(b)Figures in parenthesis are negative.
Source:  Faeth, et. al. (1991), Table 7, p. 15.70
Table 5. Effects on Net Economic Welfare (Conventionally Measured) and on Food Production of Liberalizing World Food Markets, 1990
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                 Reform in advanced industrial economies only                     Reform in industrial and developing economies
                                 
                                                                                                                                 
Change in Change in
annual net Change in production, 1000 tonnes (& %) annual net Change in production, 1000 tonnes (& %)
economic  economic
welfare beef and welfare beef and
grain sheepmeat sugar grain sheepmeat sugar
(1985 US$ (1985 US$
 billion)  billion)                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Australasia 3.0 790  (3) 420 (11) 280  (8) 0.5 -2,140 (-9) 50  (1) -690 (19)
Japan 23.0 -5,190(-45) -410(-77) -770(-72) 40.8 -5,650(-49) -450(-84) -840(-79)
North America 5.5 10,050  (3) 1,160 (10) -860(-14) 7.8 -23,410 (-6) -1,240(-10) -1,650(-26)
Western Europe 15.1 -32,980(-20) -5,190(-50) -5,060(-28) 24.2 -40,330(-25) -7,880(-76) -7,810(-44)
TOTAL, Advanced _____ ____________ ___________ ___________ ____ ____________ ___________ ___________
  Industrial Economies 46.6 -27,330 (-5) -4,020(-15) -6,410(-23) 73.3 -71,530(-12) -9,520(-36) -10,990(-40)
Bangladesh, India,
  Pakistan 1.4 1,710(1) 250(13) 130(1) 1.6 -2,000(-1) 230 (11) 930  (4)
China 2.9 7,950(2) 520(26) 650(8) 12.9 8,100 (2) 1,730(102) 1,230 (15)
Indonesia, Philippines,
  Thailand 0.9 1,680(3) 300(38) 440(6) 0.6 1,270  (2) -60 (-7) -1,632(-21)
South Korea, Taiwan -1.1 0(0) 10 (6) 40(6) 6.9 -1,710(-18) -80(-50) -100(-16)
Other Asia 0.5 90(0) 120(12) 30(2) 1.7 660  (1) 240 (23) 80  (4)
SUB-TOTAL, ____ _________ _________ ________ ____ ___________ _________ ___________
  Developing Asia 4.6 11,430(2) 1,200(21) 1,290(3) 23.7 6,320   (1) 2,060 (36) 510  (1)
Argentina 5.4 4,310(11) 1,420(37) 0 (0) 5.1 4,180 (11) 3,710 (97) 1,500(111)
Brazil 2.9 3,750 (8) 560(19) 2,370(23) 0.8 6,530 (14) 1,260 (43) 3,470 (34)
Mexico 1.2 2,840(12) 130(11) -220(-5) 0.9 1,530  (6) 540 (45) 2,960 (69)
Other Latin America 3.2 910 (5) 940(31) 710 (4) 0.8 3,310 (18) 1,730 (58) 5,090 (26)
SUB-TOTAL, ____ __________ _________ _________ ____ __________ __________ __________
  Latin America 12.7 11,810 (9) 3,050(28) 2,860 (8) 7.6 15,550 (12) 7,240 (66) 13,020(38)
North Africa and
  Middle East -2.6 -210(-0) 150 (5) 130(3) -0.2 -220(-0) 490 (17) -20(-0)
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.9 880(1) 680(17) 120(2) 2.2 5,900 (9) 1,930 (47) 2,970(42)
SUB-TOTAL, Africa and ____ _________ ________ _______ ____ _________ __________ _________
  Middle East -0.7 670(0) 830(12) 250(2) 2.0 5,680 (4) 2,420 (35) 2,950(26)
TOTAL, Developing
  Economies 16.6 23,910(3) 5,080(22) 4,400(5) 33.4 27,550(4) 11,720 (50) 16,480(19)
TOTAL, WORLD
(a) 62.5 -3.560(-0.2) 1,600(2.6) -2,000(-1.5) 106.5 -45,950(-2.8) 2,690(4.4) 5,450(4.2)                                                                                                                                                                                                      
   
(a)Includes the (small) effects in Eastern Europe and the USSR.
Source:  Printouts from the Tyers model used by Anderson and Tyers (1990), reprinted in Anderson (1991b), p. 26.71
Table 6. Agricultural Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Use of Chemical Fertilizer per Hectare,
Various Market Economies, 1979 to 1989
                                                                                                          ______________________
Agricultural Chemical fertilizer use
(b)
producer subsidy (kg per ha of arable land
equivalent (%), and permanent crops),
1979-89 1985
                                                                                                          ______________________











New Zealand 20 30
Brazil
(a) 22 42
United States 30 94
Canada 35 50
Austria 36 255








                                                                                                           ______________________
(a)PSE for 1982-87 only, from Webb, Lopez and Penn (1990).  All other PSEs are from
OECD (1990b).
(b)Total consumption of nitrogenous, phosphate and potash fertilizers.
(c)The Indonesian government provides nitrogenous fertilizer (produced domestically from
local petroleum) at very low cost to farmers.
Sources: OECD (1990b).  Webb, Lopez and Penn (1990).  Food and Agriculture Organisation,
Fertiliser Yearbook 1986, Rome.  Reprinted from Anderson (1991b), p. 27.72
Table 7
Table 7. Producer-to-border Price of Rice and Use of Chemical Fertilizer and Pesticides per
Hectare, Various Asian Economies, 1970s
                                                                                                                    _________________
Chemical fertilizer
Producer- use per ha. of Pesticide use per ha.
to-border agricultural land, of agricultural land,
price of rice, kg per year, kg per year,
1976-80 1976-79 1970-78
                                                                                                                    _________________
Burma 0.37 9 0.16
Thailand 0.70 11 0.97
Sri Lanka 0.76 65 0.11
India 0.76 32 0.33
Philippines 0.77 29 1.36
Bangladesh 0.93 11 0.02
Indonesia 0.98 57 0.38
Taiwan 1.68 205 3.48
(a)
West Malaysia 1.73 97 1.92
South Korea 1.87 311 10.70
Japan 3.91 340 14.30
                                                                                                                    _________________
(a)Based on cultivated land area only, for 1979-81, from Department of Agriculture and
Forestry, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook, Taipei, 1988.
Source: Barker, Herdt and Rose (1985, pp. 77, 89 and 237).  Reprinted from Anderson (1991b),
p. 28.